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Abstract
This paper tests empirically whether measurable activities of the IRS Criminal Inves-
tigation Division (CI) aect taxpayer compliance. The analysis is based on a state-level
cross-section for the time period from 1988 through 2001. First, I nd that CI activities
have a measurable and signicant eect on voluntary compliance. Second, I conclude
that the mix of sentenced cases (tax and money laundering) is not a signicant determi-
nant of tax compliance. Third, media attention shows some weak evidence of increasing
compliance, at least among money laundering cases. Fourth, I nd that incarceration
and probation (rather than nes) have the most inuence on taxpayers. Simulations
using the estimated models show that the direct eect of doubling the audit rate on
assessed tax collections (reported amounts and additional taxes and penalties) is $18.7
billion. Doubling CI tax and money laundering sentences is forecast to increase assessed
collections by $16.7 billion. I estimate the general deterrence or spillover eects from
either audit or CI activities to be approximately 94 percent.
JEL classication numbers: H26, H24, C33, C1
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1   INTRODUCTION  
 
The annual tax gap (i.e., the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid) is estimated to be 
$200 billion, or about 10 percent of what is collected each year from individuals and businesses. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that three-quarters of this tax gap is attributable to 
individual taxpayers. At that rate, individuals currently represent $150 billion of the tax gap, 
which is more than double the level estimated in 1985.2  While the tax gap has grown, the IRS’ 
ability to audit and enforce the tax code has diminished. For instance, in 2002, the IRS had 
roughly 13,000 revenue and tax agents devoted to examination. This number is down from the 
18,000 revenue and tax agents employed in 1995. Meanwhile, the Criminal Investigations 
Division of the IRS (CI) is considerably smaller. In 1970, CI had approximately 2,500 agents. By 
1998, the number of CI agents had increased to approximately 3,000 agents. Due to the increases 
                                            
1* This research was sponsored in part by the IRS under the project: IRS Criminal Investigation Research—
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of CI Activities on Taxpayer Compliance, TIRNO-00-D-0039. The author thanks 
Patrick Travers (Operations Research Analyst in CI Research), Peggy Opeka (Program Analyst in CI Research), 
Debbie King (Director of CI Research), Alan Plumley (Economist and Technical Advisor in IRS Office of 
Research), Mark Matthews (IRS Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement), Colleen McGuire (Senior 
Associate, ICF Consulting), as well as seminar participants at the IRS Research Conference. James Lin (Pacific 
Economics Group) provided excellent research assistance. 
2 The tax gap attributable to individual taxpayers has grown from $70 billion in 1985 to $95 billion in 1992 
(the date of the last Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program [TCMP] measurement). 
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 in the tax gap, it is important to reassess the role played by examination in taxpayers’ voluntary 
compliance and to ascertain what effect CI investigations play in general deterrence. 
 
The empirical approach used in this paper follows Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1990) 
(DGW). The DGW method can determine both specific and general deterrence effects of CI 
activities, as well as the effects of audit rates on taxpayer compliance. Although the general 
deterrence effects provided by audits have been widely acknowledged, the IRS has never 
reported the “spillover” benefits provided by audits. Spillover benefits are the increase in 
collections from taxpayers, whether or not they are audited, who report more taxes in response to 
an increased likelihood of an audit. DGW’s principal innovation was to directly estimate taxes 
due, rather than first attempting to construct a noncompliance measure and then extrapolating 
from noncompliance to revenue.  
 
The current study’s purpose is to answer several basic questions. First, does CI have a 
measurable effect on voluntary compliance, which includes both civil and criminal tax laws? 
Second, if CI does have a measurable effect on voluntary compliance, what mix of CI 
investigations has the greatest influence on voluntary compliance? (CI investigates two broad 
categories of cases: tax violations and money laundering violations.) A subsidiary inquiry is 
whether either or both types of cases have an effect on voluntary compliance with the tax laws. 
Third, does media attention and publicity on CI investigations increase the compliance effect? 
Fourth, do convictions that result in prison sentences affect compliance differently from cases 
that result in probation? 
 
In this paper, I empirically test whether the CI’s measurable activities affect taxpayer 
compliance.3 I replicate and extend the original DGW analysis to include factors that measure CI 
activity. The time period covered by the new model is 1988-2001. I reach several conclusions. 
First, I find that CI activities have a measurable effect on voluntary compliance. I found 
                                            
3 The Webster Report (Review of the IRS’ Criminal Investigation Division (William Webster), April 1999, 
observed that a previous lack of empirical evidence “makes it impossible to prove that the cases CI has investigated 
previously and is currently investigating either do or do not foster compliance.” In this study, I provide the empirical 
evidence that Judge Webster sought. 
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 statistically significant results from my measure of CI sentenced cases on general tax deterrence. 
Second, I conclude that the mix of sentenced cases (tax and money laundering) is not a 
significant determinant of tax compliance. Third, media attention shows some weak evidence of 
increasing compliance, at least among money laundering cases. However, it is logical to think 
that media attention plays an important role in disseminating information to the public. The 
significant magnitude of general deterrence results implies that media plays a large role in CI 
cases. Finally, I find that incarceration and probation (rather than fines) have the most influence 
on taxpayers.  
 
I also performed simulations to determine the direct revenue (spillover) effect of audits 
and CI activities. I find that the direct effect of doubling the audit rate on assessed tax collections 
(reported amounts and additional taxes and penalties) is $18.7 billion. Doubling CI tax and 
money laundering sentences is forecast to increase assessed collections by $16.7 billion. I 
estimate the spillover effects from both audit and CI activities to be approximately 94%. 
Doubling the audit rate or doubling money laundering sentences produced similar increases in 
total collections.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the empirical 
tax evasion literature. In Section 3, I discuss the process of criminal investigations and potential 
influences on taxpayer compliance. In Section 4, I discuss the methodology, data, and results of 
the econometric models. Section 5 presents the results of several simulations, and Section 6 
offers some conclusions. 
 
2   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) provide 
summaries of the tax compliance literature. As discussed by these authors, the IRS has made 
available to researchers few data sources that can be used to study tax compliance. With respect 
to non-experimental and non-survey data limited to the United States, there continues to be 
limited data. As discussed in the authors’ review, there are essentially two data sources. The first 
data source is the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data. These data have 
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 been analyzed by Dubin and Wilde (1988), Witte and Woodbury (1985), and Beron, Tauchen, 
and Witte (1993) for tax year 1969. These were important empirical papers on audit effects and 
compliance because they demonstrated endogeneity of audit rates and positive compliance 
effects from audits on certain audit classes. Subsequently, Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde 
(1992) used 1979 TCMP data to study tax return preparation decisions by taxpayers. Kamdar 
(1995) also utilized TCMP data in studying information return. Recently, Mete (2001) combined 
TCMP surveys conducted by the IRS for several tax years in studying the interaction among 
taxpayers, the IRS, and political ideology. 
 
The second data source is based on time-series cross-sectional information available by 
state and year. Measures of audit activity, taxes assessed, and taxes collected are taken from the 
Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the IRS. For instance, DGW (1990) used IRS audit data 
and taxpayer information measured at the state level over a 10-year period in analyzing taxpayer 
noncompliance. Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett (2001) also relied on data taken from the Annual 
Reports. Their analysis was based on 1980 through 1995 annual data (i.e., 16 observations). 
Their model specification included two equations: reported income (as a function of actual 
income, audit rates, and other factors) and an audit rate equation. Ali et. al. used filing status 
categories rather than geography in a pooled estimation procedure. However, their instrument for 
audit rates was insignificant, leading to imprecise estimates of audit effects. Giles and Caragata 
(2001) present an aggregate analysis similar to DGW (1990). Their study analyzed the ratio of 
the hidden economy to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the ratio of tax revenues to GDP.4  
 
Plumley (1996) extended the analysis in Dubin, Graetz, Wilde (1990). His time-series 
cross-section analysis covered the period 1982-1991, whereas the DGW study used data from 
1977-1986. Importantly, Plumley was the first to show that CI activities (measured as criminal 
convictions obtained per million people) were significant and positively related to compliance.5 
                                            
4 The similarity to DGW is due to using proxy evasion measures for the economy rather than direct evasion 
measures. Another similarity is using a time-series data source as opposed to a purely cross-sectional data source, 
such as the 1969 TCMP. However, DGW (1990) combined both cross-sectional and time-series information in their 
empirical analysis. 
5 Plumley modified some of the DGW reporting and compliance equations by using: (i) income and offsets 
rather than tax collected; and (ii) tax return filings relative to expected filings rather than to population. Plumley 
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3 BACKGROUND 
 
One of CI’s functions is to investigate alleged violations of the tax and money laundering 
statutes. CI has focused its activities for some time on narrowing the tax gap. Tax gap 
investigations include both tax and money laundering cases that involve tax issues. Tax gap 
investigations normally do not include illegal activity associated with narcotics investigations. 
Tax-related investigations encompass all Title 26 violations (tax evasion, failure to file, filing of 
false returns, fraudulent returns, or aiding or providing assistance to fraudulent returns) as well as 
tax violations that fall under Title 18 USC §286, 287, 371 (conspiracy to defraud the government 
or commit offense or false claims). CI also has jurisdiction over Title 31 cases (currency 
reporting violations). CI tax investigations are so-called legal source tax crimes because they 
encompass all cases involving tax violations where income is derived from legal activity, 
including questionable refund schemes, return preparer cases, excise tax cases, employment tax 
cases, and frivolous filers and nonfilers. CI also investigates illegal source financial crimes and 
narcotics-related financial crimes.  
 
The CI is literally the IRS’ criminal investigation arm. It is the only federal agency with 
the power to investigate potential criminal violations of the U.S. Tax Code. CI’s tax cases 
sometimes result from referrals by the IRS’ civil arm. During an audit or tax investigation, a case 
might be referred to the CI for criminal investigation.6 However, audits are not the sole source 
for tax-related cases. CI may investigate a tax case initiated by a special agent in the field, a 
referral from another agency (FBI, Customs, or the US Attorney or DOJ), informants, as part of 
the Grand Jury process, or as a result of refund fraud-related activity. 
 
While the IRS can investigate and audit tax returns and recommend civil penalties, CI has 
the exclusive responsibility and authority to investigate tax fraud and to recommend prosecution 
for willful and egregious tax code violations. CI’s role as a tax crimes agency expanded in 1970 
                                                                                                                                             
introduced refinements to the DGW audit rate measure (based on start rates versus closure rates) and considered new 
factors for taxpayer burden and CI enforcement activity. 
6 DGW (1990) noted that fewer and fewer cases were being referred to CI from audits over the period from 
1979 to 1988. The Webster report also noticed and discussed this same trend. 
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 under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and has been further expanded over the last 30 years to 
include narcotics investigations and money laundering violations. Money laundering cases often 
result from the record keeping requirements established in the BSA.7  
 
Money laundering activity and tax activity can be closely related. Money laundering 
activity (i.e., activity involving illegal income sources) is often a precursor to tax evasion. As 
such, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a case is primarily tax related or not. CI has 
been able to classify its cases in terms of whether they are primarily tax related or money 
laundering related. CI has further classified cases according to whether they are both tax and 
money laundering cases, tax cases only, money laundering cases only, or neither. For this study, 
I treated any case with a tax-related component as a tax case and any case with a money 
laundering component as a money laundering case.  
 
CI summarizes its activities in different ways. First, CI reports its cases by the Title and 
Section of law for which there is a violation or an alleged violation. For fiscal year 1999, for 
example, CI reports cases recommended for prosecution as follows: 1,068 for Title 26 violations; 
1,988 for Title 18 violations; and 64 for Title 31 violations. Of these 3,120 cases, CI further 
classifies 1,959 cases as fraud related and 1,161 cases as narcotics related. Tax cases, in this 
study, include all primary and secondary recommended violations of tax-related offenses (Title 
26, 18-287, 18-286, 18-371K). Money laundering cases, in this study, include all primary and 
secondary recommended violations of money laundering-related offenses (Title 18-1956, 18-
371T, 18-371M, 18-1960 or Title 31). 
 
A criminal investigation case proceeds in several steps. Generally, cases subject to 
investigation are either recommended for prosecution or are dropped. If a case is recommended 
for prosecution, then the Department of Justice (DOJ) or U.S. Attorney may proceed with the 
case, and the U.S. Attorney either issues an indictment or declines to prosecute. Indicted 
                                            
7 These requirements stipulate that banks must (1) report certain large currency transactions; (2) disclose 
foreign bank accounts; and (3) report currency movements across the border. These regulations trigger reporting 
currency transactions involving dollar amounts over $10,000. In addition, the Money Laundering Control Act 
established criminal offenses for engaging in unlawful monetary transactions. More recently, in 1996, financial 
institutions were required to report suspicious financial activity that could indicate loan fraud or money laundering. 
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 individuals may be acquitted, have their case dismissed, or be convicted. If a conviction is 
obtained, then the individual is sentenced. In this study, I analyzed CI activities from the 
perspective of cases recommended for prosecution and from the perspective of successfully 
prosecuted cases where the defendant was sentenced. Cases recommended for prosecution 
represent the outcomes of the CI procedures and protocols. Such cases may or may not be 
processed by the DOJ depending on the nature of the case or resource constraints at the DOJ. In 
most cases where there is an indictment, defendants will be found guilty and will be sentenced. 
At this point in the process, the sentence is given and the media attention paid to the case is 
measured. The impact on compliance can be experienced whenever publicity is received. This 
may include the coverage of an issued search warrant, an indictment, a plea, or a conviction. 
Media coverage acts as a form of indirect contact with the general public and provides the 
greatest amount of exposure for CI activities.  
 
4 DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
As discussed above, this study’s purpose is to update and extend DGW (1990) to analyze 
the role of CI activities on taxpayer noncompliance.  The DGW empirical analysis was based on 
two models that are both estimated using a state-level time-series cross-section. One model 
specified reported taxes per return filed as a function of audit rates and a variety of 
socioeconomic factors. The other model specified returns filed per capita as a function of the 
same variables.  
 
4.1 DATA 
The DGW analysis was based on data reported in the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1977-86. These reports include district-level 
data on IRS collections, number of returns filed, amount and number of refunds, number of 
examinations, total additional tax and penalties recommended after examination, and budgets. 
The data employed, in this study, is a compilation of annual tax enforcement, criminal 
investigation, socioeconomic, and political statistics for each U.S. state from 1977 to 2001. The 
tax collections and examination variables rely on data reported in the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, IRS Data Book, and IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin.  
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 A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The dependent variables are (i) ALR (Assessed Liability Per Return): reported individual 
income tax plus additional tax and penalty recommended after examination divided by the 
number of individual income tax returns filed, in 1972 dollars; (ii) RTR (Reported Taxes Per 
Return): reported individual income tax divided by the number of individual tax returns filed, in 
1972 dollars; and (iii) RCAP (Returns Per Capita): reported total individual income tax returns 
filed divided by total population. 
 
B. IRS ENFORCEMENT FACTORS 
The effect of audit examination on compliance is as important in the current analysis as it 
was for the original DGW study. The audit rate is defined as AUDIT (Individual Audit Rate): 
reported total individual income tax returns examined divided by total individual income tax 
returns filed and is treated endogenously.8  The dramatic decline in the individual audit rate 
(IAR) between 1977 and 1987 was followed by an equally staggering decline during the 
subsequent 15 years. Indeed, audit rates fell from 1.98 percent in 1977 to 0.59 percent by 1991. 
The decline continued through the end of the analysis period, until the individual audit rate was 
only 0.15 percent in 2001. The IRS indicates that this decline in audit rates has been partially 
offset by automated programs such as the CP2000 program and other correspondence audits. I 
examine this proposition below. Meanwhile, individual returns filed per capita (RCAP) grew 
steadily over the 25-year period by 18.44 percent, or 0.74 percent per annum.  
 
As part of this study, the IRS provided several new factors to examine tax enforcement. 
These factors refine the individual audit rate used in DGW but are limited to a subset of the 
analysis period (from 1993 forward). The first factor measures examinations of individual tax 
                                            
8 Statistics on examination coverage variables such as numbers of returns examined, additional taxes and 
penalties recommended after examination, and costs incurred by the IRS were broken down by district office and 
service center in the IRS Data Book and Annual Report. In states where there were multiple districts, I performed an 
aggregation to derive state-level figures for those factors.  The IRS Reform Act reorganized the entire district system 
and required many district offices to be responsible for the tax returns filed by multiple states. As a result, most of 
the district-level statistics from 1997 to 2001 included services provided to multiple states. Since only state-level 
data is used in the analysis, I took the 1996 allocation of examinations, additional taxes, and cost incurred for each 
state among all states in the newly defined districts and extrapolated the annual figures for 1997-2001 based on the 
1996 percentages. For states with multiple districts, the district-level data is aggregated to the state level.   
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 returns conducted by revenue agents (AUDR1). Revenue agents are required to have extensive 
accounting knowledge. Revenue agents typically audit more complex issues that involve higher 
income levels or greater deductions. Revenue agents conduct their audits in person rather than 
through the mail. As with the audit rate defined in the DGW study, I express the revenue agent 
audit rate as a fraction of individual returns examined. Revenue agent audits have declined 
significantly between 1994 and the present. The rate of these audits fell from 0.313 percent to 
0.065 percent during the period. 
 
The second examination factor represents the tax agents’ audit activity. Tax auditors or 
tax agents generally have less tax knowledge than revenue agents. They typically audit 
individual non-business returns and Schedule C returns (sole proprietorships). Relative to 
revenue agent audits, tax audits are less complex and involve lower income and expense levels. 
Expressed as a fraction of individual returns filed, tax audits (AUDR2) also show a dramatic 
decline over the last decade. The rate of these audits fell from roughly 0.428 percent to 0.086 
percent by the end of the period.9 
 
Finally, the IRS provided a measure of correspondence audits. These audits are done 
through the mail, as the name implies, and represent a modern extension of the CP2000 program 
[see DGW (1990)]. I attributed service center audits to the state in which the taxpayer resided. 
Normalizing by individual returns filed yields the third audit factor (AUDR5). Correspondence 
audits have increased from 0.261 percent in 1993 to 0.962 percent in 1996. In recent years, 
however, the rate of correspondence audits has declined; the 2001 measurement shows an 
average rate of just 0.395 percent. 
 
                                            
9 Statistics on the number of examinations and additional taxes and penalties were not published in the data 
book after 1999 and 1997, respectively.  In order to have the two variables span the entire period, I substituted the 
data obtained directly from the IRS for the published data in the post-1993 portion of the dataset. The sum of audits 
performed by both revenue agents and tax auditors tied out closely to the number of audits reported in the Data 
Book. Therefore, I used the factor (AUDR12) to extend the DGW in later years. I used the same approach for 
additional taxes and penalties. In the years where the new data and published data overlap, the correlation between 
the original and updated versions of the audit variable is 0.92. Similarly, the correlation between the two versions of 
the additional tax variable is 0.97. The resulting variable is denoted IAR2 and extends the DGW factor IAR for 
recent years where the IRS data books no longer report audit rates by state. 
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 C. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
With respect to instrumental variables, I extended the budget per return variable (BPR): 
reported total IRS budget divided by total returns filed, in 1972 dollars) used in the DGW study 
and added some new instruments. First, the IRS budget per individual return filed was estimated 
and published by the IRS through 1999. The budget (in real 1972 dollars) reached its peak of 
$5.29 per return in 1988. The growth was likely a consequence of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA).10 However, the budget per return subsequently underwent a significant decline between 
1993 and 1999, dropping from $5.18 to $3.69, ultimately falling to levels lower than those in any 
of the previous years in the analysis.11  
 
Next, the IRS provided a measure of the total available resources devoted to 
examinations [DIR_EXAM (Direct Examination): Percentage of all examiners’ time allocated to 
direct examination of the returns.]12  This percentage further refines the budget variable 
described above; it should be highly correlated with audit activity but nevertheless exogenously 
set by the IRS in any fiscal period as it corresponds to the planned examination activity.13 
Beginning in 1980 with a state average of 64.4 percent, the direct examination percentage fell to 
41.1 percent by 1988. While the percentage of time devoted to examinations rose somewhat 
through 1997 (to 54.1 percent), the pattern from 1997 to 2001 had been to reduce direct 
examination time (measured at 36.9 percent in 2001).  
 
In some models, I needed additional instruments, as I discuss further below. Following 
Mete (2002), I assembled several political factors that could be used as potential instruments. 
Based on correlations with the audit rate, I ultimately focused on four potential instruments: (1) 
the political party of the state governor (GOVR); (2) a measure for state government liberalism 
(GOVIDO); (3) the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the House (HRATIO); and (4) the ratio 
                                            
10 The TRA was a major shift in United States tax policy. Tax rates were cut, the tax base was broadened, 
IRA rules were changed, and the tax laws were generally simplified. 
11 Given the importance of this factor as an instrument for IRS audit levels, I extended this figure for the 
2000 and 2001 period at 1999 levels. There is little consequence from this approximation when budget per returns 
filed is used as an instrumental variable. 
12 DGW used a measure of information returns filed as an instrument in some of their models, but this 
factor was not available at the state level for the time period covered in this study. 
13 As discussed by Plumley (1999), the direct examination measure is a reasonably exogenous measure of 
audit activity. 
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 of Democrats to Republicans in the Senate (SRATIO).14 Based on the empirical results, I 
ultimately selected the instrument based on government liberalism and used it in conjunction 
with IRS budget per return filed and the direct examination percentage. I then used these 
instruments in a subset of models that simultaneously considered three examination factors. 
 
D. SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
I followed DGW and used several socioeconomic explanatory variables, all reported on a 
calendar year basis: STAXR (Average State Income Tax Rate): total state individual income tax 
paid as a percentage of total state personal income; PERED: percentage of the adult population 
with at least a high school education; PER65: percentage of the adult population over age 65; UI: 
the unemployment rate; PICAP: income per capita, in 1972 dollars; PMAN: percentage of the 
workforce employed in manufacturing; PSERV: percentage of the workforce employed in the 
service industry; HOUSES: households per capita; FRMFAM: farms per household; and 
PWELFAM: the percentage of all households on welfare.  
 
Most of the explanatory factors appeared to continue the trends first discussed in DGW.  
First, the percentage of families on welfare (PWELFAM) declined slightly during the 1970’s and 
1980’s, falling from 4.70 to 4.08 percent, before rising to its peak of 5.17 percent in 1994. From 
1995 through 2001, the percentage of families on welfare declined to 2.03 percent. This decline 
may have been due to welfare reform enacted in the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Personal Responsibility Act). Welfare cases necessarily 
fell when fewer individuals qualified for welfare under the PRA.  
 
Next, the number of farms per household (FRMFAM) continued to show a decline during 
the analysis period, reflecting fewer farms in the United States and a larger number of 
households. The decline was from 3.30 farms per hundred families to just over 2.06 farms per 
                                            
14 Mete (2002) provides the rationale behind these factors and discusses how they are expected to correlate 
with the audit rate. Mete argues that Republicans prefer lower levels of enforcement for all forms of regulation than 
do Democrats. Additionally, Mete argues that Republicans provide less support for increasing government spending 
and enforcement activities than Democrats. Therefore, the undesirable effects of tax enforcement on citizens may be 
worse for Republican politicians. Thus, a higher proportion of Democrats in Congress or a more liberal ideology 
score should lead to generally higher audit rates. 
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 hundred families. Unemployment rates (UI) varied notably during the late 1970’s and 1980’s. 
Reaching a peak in the early 1980’s (at 9.23 percent), unemployment has generally declined with 
the exception of the recession in the early 1990’s and the increase in unemployment that has 
occurred in recent years.  
 
Personal income in real terms (PICAP) rose steadily from 1977 through 2001. Average 
real income per capita rose from $5,066 to $8,017.  State tax rates (STAXR) rose on average 
from 4.06 percent in 1977 to 4.52 percent in 1984. From the mid-1980’s forward, the state tax 
rate grew to 4.74 percent and remained fairly steady at this level in the late 1990’s.  
 
The percentage of the population over age 65 (PER65) showed a relatively modest 
growth during the period. The percentage of employed individuals in manufacturing (PMAN) 
declined from just over 21.45 percent in 1977 to roughly 12.94 percent by 2001. The percentage 
of employed individuals in service industries (PSERV) increased from 16.61 percent in 1977 to 
nearly 29.49 percent in 2001. This pattern continues the trends described in the original DGW 
study. However, as described more fully below, the importance of manufacturing and service 
industry employees may have changed as compliance and collections associated with these 
sectors have shifted since the original 1977-1986 study of DGW. 
 
E. CI ENFORCEMENT FACTORS 
The CI provided detailed information about sentenced cases and cases recommended for 
prosecution, including media coverage and sentence type (typically probation or prison). The 
sentence counts were first broken down by the crime that was committed and then further 
distinguished by the sentence’s punishment (prison or probation) and by whether news of the 
case was released through any form of media (radio, television, print). My analysis begins by 
decomposing all CI cases that were sentenced. Sentenced cases can arise as a result of a pure tax 
investigation, a pure money laundering investigation, a combination of both tax and money 
laundering investigations, or something not related to either tax or money laundering. The 
preponderance of CI cases had either tax or money laundering aspects. In addition, sentenced 
cases may or may not have received media coverage. Finally, sentenced cases may have received 
recommendations for prison, probation, or some other fine or penalty. There are many ways in 
12 
 which to classify individual CI cases. Finding the empirical classifications that have significance 
with respect to tax compliance is one of the goals in this study. 
 
Money laundering cases, in this study, are not considered tax gap cases, except for a few 
cases that were both tax and money laundering related. I allocated these cases to both the tax and 
money laundering category. It is natural to consider how such cases can affect taxpayer 
compliance. The most plausible mechanism is through publicity. It is possible that a CI-related 
activity that receives media attention may influence some taxpayers to be more tax compliant. It 
is also possible that media coverage of money laundering cases and the sentences received by the 
individuals under indictment convey the mission of the CI division and emphasize its role in tax 
matters. To the extent that media variables are measurable for a reasonable time period, analysis 
of media attention provides a direct test of the CI message mechanism. Ultimately, it is an 
empirical question and one that I investigate in this paper. 
Total CI cases recommended for prosecution (TOTP) ranged from 2,937 cases per annum 
in 1988 to 4,126 cases in 1993. TOTP fell to 2,271 cases in 2001. Annual counts of CI tax cases 
recommended for prosecution (TP) reached 2,255 in 1993 but then fell dramatically to 991 cases 
by 2001. Money laundering cases recommended for prosecution (MP) grew rapidly, from 385 
cases in 1988 to 2,042 cases in 1992, nearly equaling the number of tax prosecutions for the 
same year (2,047). Interestingly, annual counts of money laundering prosecutions became greater 
than tax prosecutions beginning in 1997, and they have remained that way every year since.  
 
Total CI sentenced cases (TOT) ranged between 2,133 and 3,157 during the period from 
1988 through 2001. There is some evidence of a recent decline in the total cases performed by 
CI. Tax cases conducted by CI (T) have declined fairly steadily from 1988 to 2001 and declined 
from 1,876 cases per annum in 1998 to 899 cases in 2001. Conversely, money laundering cases 
(M) have risen from 132 cases per year in 1998 to a high of 1,170 cases per annum in 1994. 
There are approximately 900 such cases conducted per year at present.  
 
On a percentage basis, these patterns are quite dramatic. The number of CI tax cases as a 
percentage of total CI cases (T_TOT) fell from 76.9 percent in 1988 to 42.2 percent in 2001. 
13 
 Meanwhile, money laundering cases rose from just 5.4 percent of all CI cases (M_TOT) to 41.2 
percent by 2001.15 
 
I next turn to tax-only case disposition. Similar to tax and money laundering cases, an 
individual who is sentenced may receive prison time, probation, both prison and probation, or 
neither (typically a fine of some kind). Unlike the situation with tax and money laundering 
sentences, where few cases were sentenced for both tax and money laundering violations, most 
tax cases have both prison and probation components. For instance, in the 50 states and for the 
years 1998-2001, there were 21,604 tax sentences. Only 507 cases received neither prison nor 
probation, while 11,719 cases received both. There were 11,660 tax sentences resulting in prison 
sentences, but only 2,941 of these cases were prison-only sentences.16 
 
With respect to the way cases are disposed, tax cases that received prison sentences 
(TPRI) averaged 1,037 per annum from 1989 through 1998. After 1998, there was a decline to 
726 cases per annum in 2001. The number of tax cases that received probation (TPRO) 
fluctuated around 1,300 cases per annum from 1988 to 1998. In 2001, the amount declined to 
811 cases per annum. Money laundering cases receiving prison sentences (MPRI) increased 
dramatically from 80 cases per annum in 1988 to 1,041 cases per annum in 1994. There was an 
average of 863 cases per annum in the subsequent years from 1995 to 2001, with 785 cases per 
annum in 2001. Money laundering cases receiving probation (MPRO) followed a very similar 
pattern, rising from 68 cases per annum in 1988 to 727 cases per annum by 2001.  
 
                                            
15 As the percentages reveal, a small number of cases conducted by CI are classified neither as money 
laundering nor tax cases. Similarly, there are a few cases that have aspects of both money laundering and tax. I have 
included such cases as both money laundering and tax cases. The amount of double counting is, however, 
insignificant. 
 
16 The overlap in money laundering sentenced cases was similar. Of 11,865 sentenced money laundering 
cases, 164 received neither prison nor probation, while 7,789 received both sentence types. 
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 Media attention for tax cases rose between 1992 and 1997. It then fell starting in 1998, 
continuing to decline through 200117.  Media attention for money laundering cases followed a 
similar pattern, peaking in 1997. Cases receiving media attention (MD) rose from 1,102 in 1992 
to 2,539 per annum in 1997. However, more recently, the coverage of CI cases in the media has 
declined to 1992 levels (when such figures were first tracked by the CI division).  
 
Tax cases receiving media attention as a percentage of all media cases (TMD_MD) and 
money laundering cases receiving media attention as a percentage of all media cases 
(MMD_MD) show some modest variation, with money laundering cases receiving a growing 
percentage of coverage by the media. These two categories do not exclusively exhaust media 
attention, but the residual coverage is very small in percentage terms.  
 
With respect to sentencing, the patterns are more dramatic. The percentage of all money 
laundering cases where the defendant received a prison sentence (MPRI_M) has grown from 
60.6 percent in 1988 to 87.4 percent in 1992. During the last decade, this rate has grown further 
to 91.5 percent of money laundering cases in 1997.18  
 
Similarly, the percentage of CI money laundering cases receiving probation (MPRO_M) 
grew from 51.5 percent in 1988 to 85.7 percent in 2000. The CI division has also managed to 
improve its sentencing rate for prison and probation among its tax cases. The percentage of CI 
tax cases receiving prison sentences (TPRI_T) rose from 56.8 percent in 1988 to 80.8 percent in 
2001. Similarly, the percentage of tax cases receiving probation among all CI tax cases 
(TPRO_T) rose from 74.1 percent in 1988 to 90.2 percent in 2001. This trend is also reflected in 
the rate of prison sentences received as compared with individual returns filed. Dramatic 
increases in prison sentences are evident when comparing the number of cases receiving prison 
                                            
17 The media data provide the number of cases that received media attention and the type of media coverage 
given (i.e. newspaper, television, or radio). However, the data do not reveal the amount of media attention a case 
received. 
18 This growth cannot be attributed to mandatory sentencing guidelines already in place during this period 
and must reflect an increase in efficiency of the CI in choosing cases. 
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 sentences to the number of returns examined. However, the prison sentence rate is still more than 
100 times smaller than the audit examination rate for individuals.19  
 
4.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
DGW selected explanatory variables for the “reporting effect” equation based on two 
considerations: the size of the tax base and the taxpayers’ compliance behavior.20 The variables 
primarily related to the tax base are PER65, HOUSES, and WELFARE. The variables related to 
both the tax base and taxpayers’ compliance behavior are UR, INCOME, and STAXR. The 
variables primarily related to the taxpayers’ compliance behavior are PERED, PMAN, PSERV, 
FARMS, and AUDIT.21  
 
Additional compliance factors include variables created as part of this study to measure 
the nature and extent of CI activities. I treat CI activities as exogenous both on theoretical and 
empirical grounds. First, CI activity is largely a result of cases discovered and selected for 
examination that arise independently of tax gap or noncompliance issues. Second, Hausman 
specification tests for endogeneity of the CI enforcement factors did not reveal endogenous 
behavior.  
 
 
5 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
In principle, the additions to the original DGW study to accommodate criminal 
investigation factors are straightforward. In fact, the task is far more complex than simply 
creating and matching various factors from CI and then adding these factors to the basic model. 
For example, individuals face a complex decision process with respect to criminal activity. An 
individual may be deterred from tax evasion, money laundering, or other criminal acts based on 
                                            
19 Conviction rates have also increased in comparison to the 1978 through 1988 period. Here, I define the 
conviction rate as the total number of CI cases that are sentenced as compared to returns examined. The figures 
demonstrate the rapid increase in conviction rates for the CI division. However, as noted by DGW, the sentences at 
issue may not be a result of cases that are selected for tax examination. 
20The effects of these variables on reported taxes per return are based on conventional theoretical 
considerations. For a full discussion, see DGW(1990).   
21 I expected increases in the federal audit rate (AUDIT) to increase taxpayer compliance (and thus reported 
taxes per return), since audit rates presumably respond to compliance levels. Therefore, I cannot treat the federal 
audit rate as an exogenous factor. 
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 the likelihood of being caught. This deterrence possibility has been the empirical paradigm of 
modern criminal analysis. In this approach, a potential criminal may be deterred from 
committing a crime due to a sufficiently high probability of being caught and receiving a 
sufficiently severe penalty. Of course, not all individuals are rational actors with respect to the 
crimes they commit.  However, a rational calculus applied to crime and punishment is a 
benchmark test and provides policy makers with justification for increasing enforcement levels 
or changing the enforcement mix. Ultimately, the manner in which individuals respond is an 
empirical matter. Thus, in this approach, I assume that individuals consider the likelihood that 
they will be detected and punished.  
 
With respect to civil audit examination, a measure such as the audit rate may be 
significant to a potential tax evader because it measures the probability that the taxpayer will be 
subjected to an audit. In the current setting, the natural analogue to the audit rate is the rate at 
which CI investigations are commenced or the rate at which prosecutions are recommended. 
Prosecution rates are, in fact, quite small for individual taxpayers. As I noted above, these 
prosecution rates may be orders of magnitude smaller than the individual audit rate. A 
compounding factor is that not all cases recommended for prosecution lead to indictments, and 
not all indictments lead to sentencing. In contrast, the audit rate leads to an audit whether or not a 
change in the taxpayer’s liability is recommended. By focusing on cases sentenced, an exposure 
measure is produced that is closer to the audit rate but results in a factor that, in relative 
magnitude to the population at large, is quite small. Additionally, as a matter of general 
deterrence, it is believed that individuals respond to the probability of detection. The question 
remains as to how they learn the rates at which they are likely to be caught. Attention by the 
media would seem to be the most likely forum by which taxpayers become aware of the 
likelihood that their crimes will be detected. Therefore, those cases that are successfully 
prosecuted and sentenced and receive some media attention would appear to be most relevant. 
Finally, taxpayers may be concerned only with the sentences that result in incarceration or 
probation as compared to monetary fines. Thus, the percentage of sentenced cases that result in 
non-monetary fines may be relevant.  
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 Taxpayers may respond to the probability of an audit in a rational calculus that affects 
their decision to file a tax return or the degree to which they file an honest and correct return. 
This theory is known as deterrence theory in the literature. It has also been persuasively argued 
that taxpayers may react to the actions of other taxpayers, especially as those actions concern 
notions of fairness and support for their decisions to voluntarily comply with the law. This theory 
of taxpayer behavior is known as assurance theory (see, e.g., Roth et. al. 1989, Scholz 1998, 
Scholz and Lubell 1998a,b). Models of conformity and social dynamics (see e.g. Durlauf and 
Young, 2001) postulate that the utility of a given decision may in part be determined by the 
expected actions of others. Models of social dynamics bridge the deterrence and assurance 
theories of taxpayer compliance. Importantly, Manski (1993, 1995) has shown that for linear 
models with aggregate data there is an inherent identification problem that may not allow the 
theoretical issue to be resolved empirically.22  
 
As an empirical matter, many non-exclusive approaches could have significance. Among 
the choices are: (1) separating tax and money laundering rates; (2) separating media cases from 
non-media cases; and (3) the sentencing mix. With three types of CI cases (tax, money 
laundering, and other), media (Yes versus No, or type of coverage), and at least three sentencing 
outcomes, variables that can be used to measure CI activities quickly expand relative to the 
available years and geographic locations available for analysis. My approach simplified the 
relevant set of CI factors as much as possible, while considering specifications and models that 
would allow a full picture to emerge.  
 
V.1 EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
As discussed, the original DGW model used data for the years 1977-1986. Adding data 
for later years more than doubled the observations. However, the overall explanatory power of 
the model fell in this full data period. This change, coupled with changes in the pattern of 
coefficients for some factors, suggests that the period after 1987 (and therefore after the time 
                                            
22 Our finding that CI enforcement levels are significant determinants of taxpayer compliance would 
reinforce the assurance theory aspects of behavior rather than the deterrence theory. Conversely, the empirical 
support for significant audit rates found in this study and others suggest that deterrence theory is equally valid for 
types of taxpayer behavior. 
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 period considered in the original DGW study) was different from the earlier period in significant 
ways.  
 
Focusing on the period after 1987, the re-estimated models showed some sign changes in 
socioeconomic factors, including a shift in the roles played by the percentage of employed 
populations in manufacturing and service industries. Since these effects were previously 
understood in terms of the possibility for individual noncompliance and opportunities to evade, it 
is more likely that a change in IRS policy to focus attention on service industry geographies or a 
change in the relative economic conditions of these two sectors explains the change in predicted 
compliance.  
 
Several empirical experiments showed that CI factors have statistical significance when 
considered as counts. However, little significance remains when these counts are expressed as 
rates. While a theoretical justification may be made for using rates as estimates of probabilities, 
and while probabilities are motivated by the theoretical criminology and economics literature, 
the empirical finding is that these rates are just too small to reveal any correlation with 
compliance. However, the finding that absolute counts matter is interesting and suggests that 
general deterrence may result from the overall level of CI activity rather than the rate at which 
these investigations take place. This interpretation affirms the assurance theory of CI activity. 
 
In Table 1, I present the estimated econometric models in a logical progression from the 
DGW specifications to the final models used in this paper. The model of DGW (1988) is a steady 
state equilibrium relationship.  It is assumed that all effects are in long-run equilibrium.  
However, as audit rates change, taxpayers are assumed to change behavior and modify their 
reported taxes due.  At first blush, it is reasonable to assume that reported taxes in a given year 
react to audit rates that prevail in that year.  However, the typical IRS audit cycle may not initiate 
an audit for several years following the filling of a tax return.  Taxpayers, in this situation, must 
react to their expectation of future audit rate levels.  Alternatively, the additional taxes and 
penalties reported in a given tax year may to some degree depend on the audits of tax returns 
from previous years.  Hence, additional taxes and penalties may be some function of past audit 
rate levels. Finally, taxpayers may change their reported taxes due in a continuous adjustment to 
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 a new target level.  There may be the perception, by some taxpayers, that a rapid or 
discontinuous (abrupt) change in behavior may be a signal to the IRS of an existing or current 
tax problem.  Such taxpayers may adjust their reported taxes based on a mixture of taxes 
reported in the previous year and the optimal level of taxes due based on existing or current 
conditions. 
 
I investigated the dynamic panel specification using methods due to Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981). See also Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano (1989), and Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The empirical results indicate that a short-term dynamic is most likely at work, with the majority 
of adjustment occurring within two to three years after a change in tax policy.  Interestingly, this 
period of time for adjustment and audit expectation formation naturally corresponds to the audit 
cycle itself. 
 
Model 1 replicates DGW for the period 1977-1986, using newly collected data. I used 
instruments and specifications published in the original DGW article. The next model, Model 2, 
relies on the time period from 1988-2001, using IRS source data for the audit rate in later years 
merged with IRS Data Book audit rates, where available. Notable in this model is the switch in 
time periods covered and instruments employed. As the table shows, the IRS budget per return 
filed is a very significant factor in determining the audit rate (see the reduced form equation 
reported under Model 2 for the variable, IAR2). Also, the instrument for exam time devoted to 
direct examination is significant and positive in the audit reduced form. This finding implies that 
in districts and time periods with larger resources devoted a priori to examination, the audit rate 
is higher.  This result is clearly logical and was expected. The revised model shows that audit 
rates remain statistically significant. I previously discussed the changes in sign in some 
previously significant factors such as the percentage of employed persons in manufacturing and 
service industries. Another very significant change in results concerns the effect of audit rates on 
filings. Previously, DGW had found that an increase in audits would lead to fewer returns filed. 
 
As discussed in DGW, the relationship between socioeconomic, tax base, and tax 
compliance factors and the number of returns filed may be quite complex. With respect to 
variables that relate to taxpayers’ compliance, DGW argued that taxpayers confront three 
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 options: (1) to file a return and report honestly; (2) to file a return and underreport taxes; (3) or 
not to file a return. Anything that reduces the benefits or increases the costs of filing a return and 
underreporting taxes will increase the likelihood that a given taxpayer chooses to (1) file a return 
and report honestly or (2) not file a return. We called this the compliance principle. DGW argued 
that the compliance principle would apply very strongly to the federal audit rate because 
increases in the federal audit rate decrease the benefits and increase the costs of filing a return 
and underreporting taxes due. DGW expected (and found) that an increase in the audit rate 
decreased returns filed per capita. My results for the post-1987 period seemingly contradict the 
findings of DGW pre-1988. However, the compliance principle predicts that either returns filed 
would decline or returns filed would increase with greater compliance. My results indicate that 
the latter situation is now in effect – increases in the audit rate lead to greater levels of 
compliance and a greater number of honestly prepared returns. 
 
In Model 3, the audit rate from the IRS Data Books is replaced with the combined rate for 
revenue agent and tax agent audits. The results indicate that the selected instruments are 
significant factors in the reduced form for the audit rate and that the estimated audit effect is 
positive and statistically significant.  
 
In Model 4, I add the factor for correspondence audits to the previous specification. 
Interestingly, the significance of AUDR12 (the combined audit rate for revenue agents and tax 
agents) and of AUDR5 (the correspondence audit rate) is now lost. There is a large change in the 
estimated magnitude of the coefficients, which suggests that collinearity issues are again present. 
Pursuing this set of models, I then split the combined audit rate for revenue agents and tax agents 
into separate factors for each type of audit. This model (Model 5) again reveals general 
insignificance of these separate factors.23 Additionally, in this specification, the revenue agent 
audit effect is no longer positively associated with compliance. Given that the simplest of these 
specifications showed a significant and positive audit effect (paralleling results from the longer 
time periods), the more refined audit models do not provide useful results.  
                                            
23 This model requires the use of a third instrument as discussed above. 
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 Next, I examine models selected to measure CI effects. In Model 6, I include factors for 
tax sentences (T) and money laundering sentences (M). This model demonstrates that money 
laundering sentences have a statistically significant effect on tax compliance.  
 
Model 7 investigates the sentencing form of the explanatory factors from the previous 
model. Here, I introduce variables for: (1) the percentage of tax sentences resulting in prison 
time; (2) the percentage of tax sentences resulting in probation; (3) the percentage of money 
laundering sentences resulting in prison time; and (4) the percentage of money laundering 
sentences resulting in probation. These factors do not diminish the available degrees of freedom, 
and the estimates are performed for the same period 1988 through 2001 as in Model 6.  This 
specification fails to indicate statistical significance of tax sentences or of the various 
percentages of such cases that result in prison or probation. However, money laundering cases 
remain statistically significant in their effects on compliance. Further, the percentage of money 
laundering cases that result in prison terms raises the compliance level. However, an increase in 
the percentage of money laundering cases resulting in probation does not increase compliance.24  
 
Turning to media, I added factors for the percentage of tax and money laundering cases 
that result in any form of media attention (TMD_T and MMD_M) to the specification that 
included the total number of tax and money laundering sentences. The resulting model is Model 
8. Since media information was available only after 1992, this resulted in losing 200 
observations (50 states, 4 years). In these models, the basic variables for tax and money 
laundering sentenced cases become insignificant. These results appear to contradict the findings 
in the models with more observations. Therefore, I reject their significance. 
 
In Table 2, I aggregate prison and probation cases and consider a factor for the 
percentage of sentenced cases not receiving prison or probation. The results of these 
specifications are presented in Table 2. I modify Model 7 by replacing the factors for prison and 
probation rates in tax and money laundering sentences with variables for the percentage of tax 
and money laundering sentences receiving neither prison nor probation (Model 9). As was the 
                                            
24 The percentage of tax or money laundering cases not resulting in prison or probation was also not 
statistically significant in these models. 
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 case in Model 7, the variable for counts of money laundering sentences is statistically significant. 
In addition, the percentage of money laundering cases receiving neither prison nor probation has 
a significantly negative effect on compliance. The audit rate effects are also consistently positive 
and significant.  
 
Model 10 combines the tax and money laundering sentences into a single explanatory 
factor. This variable reveals statistical significance. However, the percentages of cases that are 
tax or money laundering cases are statistically insignificant.  (The coefficients indicate that the 
higher percentage of tax cases vs. money laundering cases is of greater significance.) Model 11 
adds the sentencing effect and reveals that sentenced cases that receive neither prison nor 
probation are negatively associated with compliance. Finally, Model 12 combines all CI cases 
(tax, money laundering, and other) into a single explanatory factor. I find that this factor is also 
statistically significant in its effect on compliance.  
 
I conclude from these final specifications that CI activity has a statistically significant 
and demonstrable effect on tax compliance. However, while I have found that sentenced cases 
that do not receive prison time or probation lead to lower compliance levels, I am not able to find 
a specific mix of tax and money laundering cases that would raise compliance over existing 
levels. The percentages of these cases with respect to total sentences did not have statistically 
significant effects on compliance.25 
 
V.2 SIMULATIONS 
I performed two basic simulations to determine the direct revenue (spillover) effect of 
audits. Following the methodology established in DGW, I calculated a predicted value for the 
increase in total assessed liability for a particular year that would have resulted from holding 
audit rates at their earlier period (higher) levels. I also calculated the effect of this audit rate 
change on reported liabilities (excluding additional taxes and penalties resulting from IRS 
examinations). The difference between the two estimates represents the direct revenue effect of 
                                            
25 The shortened time period available to study media effects on the subcomponent of examinations did not 
allow me to precisely measure these effects. Given the large general deterrence effect found for CI activities, there is 
indirect evidence of a large media effect, even if the econometric model did not have sufficient data to isolate this 
result. 
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 the increase in audit rates. DGW estimated that the spillover effects of audits produce six out of 
every seven dollars of additional revenue. 
 
In these simulations, a change in the audit rate (and later the levels of CI activity) leads to 
two measurable effects. First, the change in audit rate causes assessed liabilities to increase and 
reported liabilities to increase. Let dALR denote the change in assessed liability per return for a 
change in the audit rate of dIAR. Similarly, let dRTR denote the change in reported tax liability 
per return for the same change in audit rate dIAR. DGW called the change dALR the total 
revenue effect (since it includes both reported amounts and additional taxes and penalties) and 
dRTR the indirect effect. The direct effect of audits is defined as dALR-dRTR. Since ALR-RTR 
is a measure of additional taxes and penalties, dALR-dRTR is simply the change in additional 
tax and penalties resulting from the audit change. Consequently, it is the direct effect. DGW 
defined the spillover measure as the ratio dRTR/dALR since it measures the percentage of the 
total change that occurs from general deterrence as a result of the change in the audit rate.26  
 
I considered several experiments. In some cases, I doubled individual components such 
as the audit rate. Similarly, I considered doubling the number of tax sentences or doubling the 
number of money laundering sentences. In some cases, I doubled both the number of tax and 
money laundering cases. For variables measured in percentages (such as the percentage of 
money laundering cases that received prison sentences), I increased the percentage by 25 percent 
absolutely. Noticing in some cases that certain variables had statistically insignificant 
coefficients, I experimented with the same model but only increased the levels of the significant 
variables (generally the money laundering components).  
 
                                            
26The simulations rely on two simultaneous predicted changes in all cases. As I discussed, the simulation 
affects the level of assessed liabilities per return filed or reported liabilities per return filed. However, the simulation 
also affects the estimated number of returns filed per capita. In conjunction with estimates of population (and after 
conversion from real to nominal terms), the product of population, predicted returns per capita, and collections per 
return filed yields the final dollar figures in the tables. Hence, in some cases, the sign on a single variable in a model 
is not sufficient to understand the overall significance of increasing one or more components in the model. 
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 The simulations are provided in Table 3. For example, consider the simulation in which 
audit rates are doubled. The first row in Model 11 of Table 3 shows that for Model 11 estimated 
assessed tax collections would rise to $959.1 billion from $940.4 billion in 2001. The change of 
$18.706 billion is the total revenue effect. The estimates also show that reported tax collections 
rise by $17.571 billion. This change is the indirect effect of doubling the audit rate. The 
difference between these two estimated differences is approximately $1.135 billion and 
represents the direct revenue effect. This amount is 93.9 percent of the total revenue effect. 
 
Doubling CI activity (tax and money laundering cases) leads to $15.698 billion in 
increased reported taxes, $16.68 billion in increased per annum assessed tax revenue, and a 
direct revenue increase of $0.982 billion. Hence, the spillover effect is measured to be 
approximately 94%. Importantly, doubling CI activity or doubling the IRS audit examination rate 
leads to similar revenue increases and implies similar levels of increased general deterrence. 
 
As seen in Table 3, the estimated spillover effects are large but depend to some degree on 
the model. The calculation of confidence intervals for the simulations conducted in our study are 
complicated for several reasons. First, total reported taxes due rise as the product of collections 
per return and returns filed per capita. Audit and enforcement effects are present in both 
equations for these variables.  Further complications arise due to the dynamics in the models, the 
conversion from real to nominal terms, and the adjustment from per capita to total dollars. An 
alternate procedure is to simulate the audit/enforcement experiments using estimated coefficients 
that are one or two standard errors different from the estimated values.  We have followed this 
procedure for our main simulation results.  
 
For simulations in which the audit rate is doubled, I find that a 90 percent lower bound on 
the estimated increase in reported taxes is $11.468 billion. A similar lower bound on the 
estimated increase in assessed tax revenue is $12.578 billion. At the lower bound estimates, the 
spillover effect is 91.2 percent. For simulations in which CI enforcement levels are doubled, I 
find that a 90 percent lower bound on the estimated increase in reported taxes is $3.348 billion.  
A similar lower bound on the estimated increase in assessed tax revenue is $4.309 billion. At the 
lower bound estimates, the spillover effect is 77.7 percent. There are two important conclusions 
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In 1991, Plumley reported a unit cost of $1,298 per audit and a unit cost of $103,064 per 
CI conviction. These are $1,597 and $126,801 in 2001 after adjusting for inflation. In the same 
year, there were approximately 202,244 individual audits performed and only roughly 2000 tax 
and money laundering sentences. Plumley’s estimates of unit costs include overhead, support, 
and follow-on costs.   
 
Doubling tax and money laundering sentences would cost $254 million (at these unit cost 
estimates), while doubling the audit rate would cost $323 million. However, doubling the audit 
rates is predicted to lead to an $18.71 billion increase in per annum reported collections, while 
doubling tax and money laundering cases was predicted to increase reported tax collection by 
$16.68 billion per annum. Hence, an additional dollar allocated to audit would return $58 in 
general deterrence27, while an additional dollar allocated to CI would result in $66. Thus, there is 
some evidence that resources between civil and criminal enforcement at the IRS have been 
misallocated, with CI’s activities receiving too few resources. This difference is not statistically 
different from zero. A 90 percent lower bound on additional reported collections per dollar cost 
is $39 for the doubled audit rate simulation and $17 for the doubled CI activities simulation. 
 
However, as I mentioned above, it is unlikely that CI could double its activity level 
without incurring substantially greater costs than these marginal (per unit) estimates imply. 
Moreover, the larger the increase in CI activity we simulate through the model, the less reliable 
the estimates become if we move away from measurable historical experience. Doubling CI 
activity is very different from doubling the individual audit rate, since CI has never operated at 
twice its current size. Conversely, doubling the individual audit rate is within the IRS’ historical 
experience. 
 
Still, an increase in the IRS budget of $25 million allocated to CI for additional 
investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing would not appear to push the envelope of historical 
experience. Such an amount might be used to increase tax and money laundering cases by 
                                            
27 Plumley’s (1991) estimate of the return to audits was similar. He found a marginal indirect revenue to 
cost ratio of 55. 
 roughly 200 per year. This represents a roughly 10 percent increase in tax and money laundering 
cases at 2001 levels. But, more important, this increase is within the range of historical CI 
experience. According to the simulations, general deterrence would rise by nearly $1.7 billion as 
a result of the $25 million allocation to cases processed by CI. With fixed budgets, a cost savings 
of this magnitude allocated to prosecutions and sentences could achieve the same result if 
efficiency and productivity gains could be achieved. 
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TABLE 1 
ALR RTR RCAP IAR ALR RTR RCAP IAR2 ALR RTR RCAP AUDR12
Constant 0.59             0.55         303.24             0.89             0.24             0.27         180.34             2.14             1.50             1.53         169.02                (0.21)
(2.94) (2.77) (10.18) (1.57) (0.70) (0.79) (5.13) (3.37) (3.55) (3.65) (3.49) (-0.33)
-0.00023 0.00089 0.67656 0.03000 0.01515 0.01430 -0.47104 0.05970 0.00780 0.00750 -1.65160 0.09530
(-0.03) (0.13) (0.69) (1.47) (1.85) (1.76) (-0.66) (4.16) (0.75) (0.72) (-1.49) (7.97)
State Tax Rate -0.0144 -0.0149 -3.4992 -0.047 -0.0042 -0.0041 -2.2240 -0.0120 -0.0250 -0.0260 -0.1850 -0.0180
(-1.72) (-1.79) (-2.87) (-1.95) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-2.84) (-0.98) (-3.02) (-3.05) (-0.14) (-1.45)
0.254 0.250 15.149 -0.244 0.338 0.339 11.608 -0.134 0.314 0.315 16.149 -0.084
(16.88) (16.79) (6.76) (-5.9) (18.19) (18.31) (6.07) (-4.24) (16.54) (16.65) (7.38) (-3.17)
Family Size -0.690 -0.679 -105.775 -2.308 -2.220 -2.318 578.597 1.131 -0.355 -0.454 349.885 1.061
(-1.26) (-1.23) (-1.38) (-1.42) (-2.18) (-2.29) (5.9) (0.6) (-0.35) (-0.45) (3.13) (0.72)
Farms Per Household -3.98 -3.97 -270.12 -5.19 0.63 0.82 -191.74 3.86 -3.96 -3.79 -87.30 7.12
(-4.46) (-4.55) (-1.92) (-1.97) (0.31) (0.4) (-0.59) (1.01) (-1.62) (-1.55) (-0.23) (1.99)
-0.16 -0.09 143.64 3.12 -0.68 -0.69 30.17 -1.19 -1.93 -1.94 90.58 0.28
(-1.08) (-0.59) (6.11) (7.87) (-4.93) (-5.04) (2.5) (-4.56) (-6.56) (-6.63) (2.85) (0.64)
Percent of Pop Over 65 -0.27 -0.20 -129.67 -0.85 2.58 2.62 -397.95 -7.81 0.57 0.63 -327.82 -4.15
(-0.56) (-0.41) (-1.76) (-0.61) (2.32) (2.36) (-2.87) (-4) (0.45) (0.5) (-1.84) (-2.27)
0.08 0.11 47.40 0.81 -1.00 -1.00 211.38 -0.55 -0.25 -0.25 141.15 -0.28
(0.49) (0.66) (1.81) (1.68) (-2.98) (-2.99) (5.56) (-0.86) (-0.6) (-0.6) (2.52) (-0.44)
-1.72 -1.77 211.93 0.88 0.36 0.37 8.76 0.75 -0.43 -0.43 -1.81 0.69
(-6.32) (-6.62) (4.9) (1.06) (0.88) (0.92) (0.22) (0.99) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.03) (0.92)
Unemployment Rate -0.95 -0.97 -311.01 -2.88 -3.11 -3.13 -185.50 -0.44 -6.83 -6.84 -171.18 1.94
(-3.49) (-3.5) (-8.67) (-3.44) (-5.51) (-5.59) (-4.02) (-0.42) (-9.33) (-9.39) (-2.31) (1.74)
Dummy (Year>1980) 0.069 0.063 -0.853 0.010
(5.14) (4.57) (-0.5) (0.25) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.12 0.11 -14.25 0.15 0.13 16.15
(5.05) (4.59) (-4.22) -- (3.42) (3.13) (4.44) -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.117 0.097 35.625
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (2.16) (1.81) (6.42) --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Tax Sentences
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-0.133
-- -- -- (-9.45) -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1.019 1.229
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- (5.26) -- -- -- (8.1)
258.945 24.447 16.094
-- -- -- (10.89) -- -- -- (10.19) -- -- -- (7.97)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
DGW2:  obsno=500    years: 1977-1986
DGW_IAR2A:  obsno=700    years: 1988-2001
DGW93_12,5:  obsno=450    years: 1993-2001
DGW93_1,2,5:  obsno=450    years: 1993-2001
DGW_TM1:  obsno=700    years: 1988-2001
DGW_TM3:  obsno=700   years: 1988-2001
DGW_MD1:  obsno=500   years: 1992-2001
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Percent of Employed Persons 
in Manufacturing
Percent of Employed Persons 
in Service
Audit Rate
VARIABLE
Percent of Families on 
Welfare
Personal Income Per Capita
Percent of Adults with High 
School Diploma
Audit Rate (Service Centers)
Total Sentences
Money Laundering Sentences
Audit Rate (Revenue Agents)
Audit Rate (Revenue 
Agents+Tax Auditors)
Audit Rate (Tax Auditors)
Percent of Money Laun Sent 
Resulting in Prison
State Government Ideology 
(100 is most liberal)
Percent of Tax Sentences in 
Media
Percent of Money Laundering 
Sentences in Media
Percent of Tax Sentences 
Resulting in Prison
Percent of Tax Sentences 
Resulting in Probation
Percent of Money Laun Sent 
Resulting in Probation
Info returns not W2 filed / tot 
number of info returns filed
Direct Examination Time
Budget Per Return
--
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
ALR RTR RCAP AUDR12 AUDR5 ALR RTR RCAP AUDR1 AUDR2 AUDR5 ALR RTR RCAP IAR2
Constant          9.91          9.80 1817.36           (0.33)        (10.99)           0.90         0.95       201.06           0.09          (0.40)          (9.25)           0.20           0.24         188.76           2.13 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (-0.46) (-1.72) (0.57) (0.61) (0.82) (0.23) (-0.88) (-1.51) (0.6) (0.69) (5.42) (3.4)
-0.233 -0.227 -68.993 0.098 0.274 0.067 0.065 7.407 0.043 0.054 0.266 0.01087 0.01026 -0.24503 0.05970
(-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.21) (7.6) (2.37) (1.07) (1.06) (0.78) (6.27) (6.48) (2.35) (1.31) (1.24) (-0.34) (4.09)
State Tax Rate -0.1246 -0.1211 -36.35 -0.0210 0.1250 -0.0219 -0.0225 -1.2784 -0.0070 -0.0130 0.1430 -0.0034 -0.0032 -2.3815 -0.0120
(-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.2) (-1.12) (0.75) (-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.31) (-0.78) (-1.2) (0.98) (-0.54) (-0.52) (-3.09) (-1.08)
0.326 0.325 30.70 -0.079 0.024 0.255 0.258 2.485 -0.055 -0.027 0.043 0.335 0.336 11.874 -0.131
(1.4) (1.45) (0.36) (-2.58) (0.09) (4.38) (4.52) (0.28) (-3.4) (-1.4) (0.16) (18.35) (18.46) (6.26) (-4.21)
Family Size -16.755 -16.577 -2582.63 1.830 20.874 0.451 0.330 139.855 -0.047 1.630 18.579 -1.754 -1.854 529.818 1.005
(-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.17) (1.14) (1.45) (0.14) (0.1) (0.28) (-0.06) (1.58) (1.32) (-1.74) (-1.85) (5.33) (0.54)
Farms Per Household -5.63 -5.12 -660.72 10.70 4.03 -3.58 -3.25 -656.14 1.01 8.15 0.02 0.37 0.54 -130.62 3.81
(-0.12) (-0.11) (-0.08) (1.93) (0.08) (-0.59) (-0.54) (-0.67) (0.39) (2.6) (0) (0.19) (0.27) (-0.42) (1.02)
-0.79 -0.80 141.47 0.30 -1.66 -1.10 -1.15 353.58 0.57 -0.27 -1.66 -0.73 -0.74 35.84 -1.18
(-0.12) (-0.12) (0.14) (0.63) (-0.4) (-1.19) (-1.27) (2.54) (2.26) (-0.88) (-0.4) (-5.11) (-5.24) (2.91) (-4.4)
Percent of Pop Over 65 -7.58 -7.60 -1168.83 -5.61 12.34 1.88 1.94 -64.36 -0.80 -4.35 11.00 2.24 2.30 -388.86 -7.52
(-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-2.21) (0.54) (0.58) (0.61) (-0.13) (-0.64) (-2.87) (0.53) (2.07) (2.13) (-2.86) (-3.94)
7.60 7.44 2146.70 0.07 -10.29 -1.47 -1.44 -26.51 -0.15 0.14 -10.44 -0.90 -0.90 192.35 -0.60
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (-1.4) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-0.1) (-0.37) (0.27) (-1.53) (-2.75) (-2.77) (5.12) (-0.96)
-9.49 -9.29 -2332.85 0.37 11.58 -0.41 -0.41 -254.88 -0.29 0.82 9.67 0.15 0.16 26.20 0.75
(-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.21) (0.43) (1.5) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.94) (-0.63) (1.5) (1.29) (0.37) (0.4) (0.65) (0.99)
Unemployment Rate -13.01 -12.92 -1447.67 1.79 7.82 -6.15 -6.20 -105.68 0.26 1.52 7.88 -3.13 -3.15 -184.41 -0.42
(-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.21) (1.58) (0.77) (-3.53) (-3.64) (-0.4) (0.42) (2.04) (0.78) (-5.55) (-5.63) (-3.98) (-0.39)
Dummy (Year>1980)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.15 0.13 16.17
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (3.48) (3.19) (4.44) --
-1.3842 -1.3557 -339.36
-- -- -- -- -- (-1.19) (-1.2) (-1.95) -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.36 0.34 124.53
(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.56 0.52 156.77
-- -- -- -- -- (1.54) (1.48) (2.9) -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.78 0.76 254.28 -0.08 -0.08 -0.60
(0.22) (0.22) (0.2) -- -- (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.03) -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Tax Sentences 0.00000 -0.00004 0.03478 0.00000
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (-0.01) (-0.11) (0.98) (0.12)
0.00112 0.00111 -0.08360 0.00000
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (2.87) (2.86) (-2.47) (-0.24)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1.182 -0.15 0.189 1.015 -0.339 1.028
-- -- -- (7.68) (-0.11) -- -- -- (2.24) (9.99) (-0.25) -- -- -- (5.29)
16.104 -8.307 5.302 10.783 -8.088 24.494
-- -- -- (8.09) (-0.46) -- -- -- (4.84) (8.19) (-0.45) -- -- -- (10.16)
0 0 -0.005
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (0.65) (0.29) (-1.08) -- -- -- --
DGW2:  obsno=500    years: 1977-1986
DGW_IAR2A:  obsno=700    years: 1988-2001
DGW93_12,5:  obsno=450    years: 1993-2001
DGW93_1,2,5:  obsno=450    years: 1993-2001
DGW_TM1:  obsno=700    years: 1988-2001
DGW_TM3:  obsno=700   years: 1988-2001
DGW_MD1:  obsno=500   years: 1992-2001
MODEL 5MODEL 4VARIABLE
Percent of Families on 
Welfare
Personal Income Per Capita
Percent of Adults with High 
School Diploma
Percent of Employed 
Persons in Manufacturing
Percent of Employed 
Persons in Service
Audit Rate
Audit Rate (Revenue 
Agents)
Audit Rate (Revenue 
Agents+Tax Auditors)
Percent of Money 
Laundering Sentences in 
M diPercent of Tax Sentences 
Resulting in Prison
Percent of Tax Sentences 
Resulting in Probation
Audit Rate (Tax Auditors)
Audit Rate (Service 
Centers)
Total Sentences
Money Laundering 
Sentences
Budget Per Return
State Government Ideology 
(100 is most liberal)
MODEL 6
Percent of Money Laun 
Sent Resulting in Prison
Percent of Money Laun 
Sent Resulting in Probation
Info returns not W2 filed / 
tot number of info returns 
filedDirect Examination Time
Percent of Tax Sentences in 
Media
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 TABLE 1 (cont.) 
ALR RTR RCAP IAR2 ALR RTR RCAP IAR2
Constant             0.23             0.25         204.67             1.55             1.43             1.47         147.95 -0.001
(0.7) (0.77) (5.86) (2.6) (3.6) (3.7) (3.4) (0)
0.00825 0.00775 -0.48990 0.06330 0.00786 0.00765 -1.56726 0.09710
(0.98) (0.93) (-0.65) (4.46) (0.8) (0.78) (-1.58) (8.3)
State Tax Rate -0.0055 -0.0054 -2.4248 -0.0120 -0.0253 -0.0254 -0.2042 -0.0170
(-0.95) (-0.93) (-3.16) (-1.16) (-3.09) (-3.1) (-0.17) (-1.38)
0.329 0.330 12.019 -0.119 0.311 0.312 16.453 -0.080
(18.99) (19.1) (6.38) (-4.09) (17.32) (17.41) (8.32) (-3.1)
Family Size -1.527 -1.604 510.856 1.419 -0.954 -1.052 407.125 0.279
(-1.57) (-1.66) (5.1) (0.8) (-1) (-1.1) (4.05) (0.19)
Farms Per Household -0.24 -0.09 -134.29 4.53 -2.92 -2.71 -23.80 7.16
(-0.13) (-0.05) (-0.44) (1.34) (-1.22) (-1.14) (-0.07) (2.01)
-0.72 -0.74 31.86 -1.06 -1.71 -1.73 89.30 0.29
(-5.12) (-5.22) (2.55) (-4.01) (-6.91) (-7.00) (3.54) (0.77)
Percent of Pop Over 65 1.90 1.95 -401.06 -7.04 1.28 1.32 -321.31 -4.27
(1.89) (1.94) (-2.98) (-4.04) (1.06) (1.10) (-2.04) (-2.4)
-0.78 -0.78 180.60 -0.51 -0.33 -0.33 144.80 -0.08
(-2.55) (-2.54) (4.8) (-0.9) (-0.82) (-0.82) (2.9) (-0.14)
0.13 0.15 -0.42 1.30 -0.32 -0.30 -41.06 0.91
(0.33) (0.38) (-0.01) (1.8) (-0.68) (-0.64) (-0.8) (1.29)
Unemployment Rate -3.13 -3.15 -193.25 0.08 -6.53 -6.55 -89.36 1.31
(-5.55) (-5.62) (-4.14) (0.08) (-10.46) (-10.53) (-1.46) (1.36)
Dummy (Year>1980)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.14 0.13 17.33 0.10 0.09 31.07
(3.28) (2.98) (4.75) -- (2.06) (1.71) (6.31) --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Tax Sentences -0.00010 -0.00013 0.03410 0.00000 0.00048 0.00047 0.01078 -0.001
(-0.27) (-0.37) (0.95) (0.27) (1.17) (1.15) (0.26) (-1.49)
0.00121 0.00120 -0.08378 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00003 -0.04440 0.001
(3.15) (3.14) (-2.46) (-0.37) (0.00) (-0.07) (-0.92) (1.25)
-0.044 -0.044 4.248 0.026
-- -- -- -- (-2.22) (-2.23) (2.25) (0.87)
0.025 0.024 3.933 -0.024
-- -- -- -- (1.54) (1.49) (2.51) (-0.95)
-0.023 -0.022 3.354 -0.017
(-0.93) (-0.88) (1.67) (-0.38) -- -- -- --
0.00046 -0.00059 -1.53718 0.082
(0.02) (-0.02) (-0.65) (1.53) -- -- -- --
-0.038 -0.037 0.200 -0.150
(-1.89) (-1.86) (0.12) (-3.95) -- -- -- --
0.049 0.047 3.896 -0.012
(2.31) (2.2) (2.25) (-0.31) -- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1.142 1.238
-- -- -- (5.95) -- -- -- (8.15)
23.862 15.579
-- -- -- (9.98) -- -- -- (8.5)
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
DGW2:  obsno=500    years: 1977-1986
DGW_IAR2A:  obsno=700    years: 1988-2001
DGW93_12,5:  obsno=450    years: 1993-2001
DGW93_1,2,5:  obsno=450    years: 1993-2001
DGW_TM1:  obsno=700    years: 1988-2001
DGW_TM3:  obsno=700   years: 1988-2001
DGW_MD1:  obsno=500   years: 1992-2001
Budget Per Return
State Government Ideology (100 is 
most liberal)
Percent of Tax Sentences 
Resulting in Probation
Percent of Money Laun Sent 
Resulting in Prison
Percent of Money Laun Sent 
Resulting in Probation
Info returns not W2 filed / tot 
number of info returns filed
Percent of Tax Sentences in Media
Percent of Money Laundering 
Sentences in Media
Percent of Tax Sentences 
Resulting in Prison
Direct Examination Time
Audit Rate (Tax Auditors)
Audit Rate (Service Centers)
Total Sentences
Money Laundering Sentences
Percent of Employed Persons in 
Service
Audit Rate
Audit Rate (Revenue Agents)
Audit Rate (Revenue Agents+Tax 
Auditors)
Percent of Families on Welfare
Personal Income Per Capita
Percent of Adults with High School 
Diploma
Percent of Employed Persons in 
Manufacturing
MODEL 7 MODEL 8VARIABLE
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TABLE 2 
 
ALR RTR RCAP IAR2 ALR RTR RCAP IAR2 ALR RTR RCAP IAR2 ALR RTR RCAP IAR2
Constant            0.19            0.22            0.19            1.91            0.14            0.17            0.19            1.87            0.12            0.15            0.19            1.61            0.21            0.23            0.20            1.55 
(0.57) (0.66) (5.42) (3.24) (0.43) (0.52) (5.33) (3.06) (0.38) (0.46) (5.44) (2.85) (0.64) (0.7) (5.75) (2.61)
0.00559 0.00521 -0.00056 0.06501 0.00926 0.00866 -0.00027 0.06129 0.00352 0.00316 -0.00058 0.06608 0.00732 0.00680 -0.00047 0.06329
(0.65) (0.61) (-0.73) (4.71) (1.12) (1.05) (-0.37) (4.29) (0.41) (0.37) (-0.73) (4.93) (0.88) (0.82) (-0.62) (4.48)
Family Size -1.7768 -1.8732 0.5175 1.0760 -1.7869 -1.8774 0.5684 1.4303 -1.7491 -1.8335 0.5490 1.5028 -1.7046 -1.7863 0.5508 1.4841
(-1.78) (-1.88) (5.15) (0.61) (-1.84) (-1.93) (5.72) (0.8) (-1.83) (-1.92) (5.45) (0.91) (-1.78) (-1.87) (5.57) (0.85)
-0.369 -0.172 -0.190 5.361 0.511 0.679 -0.213 4.183 -0.341 -0.143 -0.268 5.642 0.226 0.399 -0.218 4.353
(-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.63) (1.53) (0.28) (0.37) (-0.71) (1.22) (-0.19) (-0.08) (-0.92) (1.8) (0.13) (0.22) (-0.73) (1.32)
-0.711 -0.726 0.038 -1.160 -0.602 -0.615 0.029 -1.124 -0.589 -0.602 0.030 -1.076 -0.633 -0.643 0.026 -1.092
(-5.02) (-5.15) (3) (-4.57) (-4.3) (-4.42) (2.3) (-4.25) (-4.24) (-4.35) (2.37) (-4.33) (-4.61) (-4.7) (2.08) (-4.27)
Unemployment Rate -3.10 -3.13 -0.19 -0.10 -3.06 -3.08 -0.19 -0.03 -3.01 -3.03 -0.20 0.35 -3.03 -3.05 -0.20 0.07
(-5.49) (-5.57) (-3.97) (-0.09) (-5.4) (-5.46) (-4.03) (-0.03) (-5.3) (-5.36) (-4.1) (0.35) (-5.37) (-5.44) (-4.25) (0.07)
0.33 0.34 0.01 -0.11 0.32 0.33 0.01 -0.12 0.32 0.32 0.01 -0.11 0.32 0.33 0.01 -0.12
(18.57) (18.68) (6.4) (-3.86) (18.53) (18.63) (6.33) (-4.13) (18.93) (19.02) (6.52) (-3.82) (18.95) (19.05) (6.39) (-4.09)
Percent of Employed Persons in -0.75 -0.76 0.19 -0.91 -0.75 -0.75 0.19 -0.64 -0.57 -0.58 0.19 -0.92 -0.75 -0.75 0.18 -0.53
(-2.3) (-2.33) (5.12) (-1.57) (-2.42) (-2.43) (5.09) (-1.1) (-1.88) (-1.9) (5.02) (-1.72) (-2.47) (-2.47) (4.87) (-0.94)
0.13 0.14 0.02 0.70 0.37 0.39 0.00 0.98 0.34 0.35 -0.01 0.96 0.29 0.31 -0.02 1.24
(0.32) (0.35) (0.54) (0.98) (0.94) (0.99) (-0.03) (1.34) (0.86) (0.91) (-0.2) (1.42) (0.74) (0.8) (-0.47) (1.75)
2.40 2.45 -0.37 -7.35 1.88 1.93 -0.39 -7.03 1.98 2.02 -0.37 -6.79 1.79 1.84 -0.40 -6.95
(2.23) (2.29) (-2.71) (-4.12) (1.85) (1.9) (-2.88) (-3.96) (2) (2.04) (-2.75) (-4.17) (1.81) (1.85) (-2.98) (-4.05)
State Tax Rate -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0023 -0.0133 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.012
(-0.93) (-0.89) (-3.39) (-0.59) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-2.94) (-1.24) (-1.37) (-1.33) (-3.24) (-0.86) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-3.05) (-1.17)
0.00046 0.00045 -0.00003 0.00000
(2.32) (2.24) (-1.27) (0.01)
0.0005 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.00055 0.00053 -0.00003 0.00006
(2.23) (2.14) (-1.08) (0.17) (2.29) (2.19) (-1.23) (0.15)
0.00001 -0.00003 0.00003 0.00012
(0.02) (-0.08) (0.84) (0.19)
0.00111 0.00110 -0.00008 -0.00024
(2.84) (2.83) (-2.47) (-0.34)
0.03242 0.03075 -0.00004 -0.14580 0.03836 0.03642 0.00047 -0.14956
(0.89) (0.85) (-0.01) (-2.17) (1.05) (1) (0.15) (-2.35)
1.14E-02 9.47E-03 1.43E-03 -2.41E-01 2.06E-02 1.80E-02 2.58E-03 -2.64E-01
(0.27) (0.23) (0.42) (-3.23) (0.49) (0.43) (0.73) (-3.73)
3.33E-02 2.76E-02 9.69E-03 -4.31E-01 0.006 -0.001 0.012 -0.468
(0.37) (0.31) (1.31) (-2.71) (0.06) (-0.01) (1.59) (-2.95)
-3.55E-01 -3.39E-01 -1.82E-02 9.41E-01 -3.55E-01 -3.38E-01 -1.85E-02 9.48E-01
(-4.48) (-4.3) (-2.76) (8.61) (-4.44) (-4.26) (-2.75) (8.72)
0.04609 0.04346 0.00418 -0.15003
(2.16) (2.05) (2.41) (-3.94)
-1.97E-02 -1.82E-02 3.11E-03 -1.94E-02
(-0.79) (-0.73) (1.54) (-0.42)
-3.48E-02 -3.40E-02 1.87E-05 -1.25E-02
(-1.74) (-1.71) (0.01) (-0.34)
0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.081
(0.1) (0.07) (-0.68) (1.52)
0.18 0.17 0.02 1.35E-01 1.22E-01 1.66E-02 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.02
(3.93) (3.64) (4.69) (3.19) (2.89) (4.5) (3.66) (3.35) (4.73) (3.15) (2.84) (4.77)
22.06 24.51 22.11 23.95
(9.49) (10.22) (9.57) (10.04)
1.05145 1.05 1.08 1.14
(5.71) (5.43) (5.89) (5.97)
Number of observations:  700 
Years of analysis:  1988-2001
Tax Pris Sentences / Tax Sentences
Money Laun Prob Sentences / Money 
Laun Sentences
Tax Prob Sentences / Tax Sentences
MODEL 12MODEL 11MODEL 10
Direct Examination Time
Money Laun Sentences Neither Pris nor 
Prob / Total Money Laun Sentences
MODEL 9
Percent of Pop Over 65
Money Laun Sentences
Percent of Employed Persons in Service
Percent of Adults with High School 
Diploma
Tax Sentences
Tax Sentences Neither Pris nor Prob / 
Total Tax Sentences
Audit Rate
Budget Per Return
VARIABLE
Percent of Families on Welfare
Farms Per Household
Personal Income Per Capita
Total Sentences
Total Sentences Either Tax or Money 
Laundering
Tax Sentences / Total Sentences
Money Laun Sentences / Total Sentences
Money Laun Pris Sentences / Money Laun 
Sentences
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TABLE 3 
Modified 
Amount 
($millions)
Original Amount 
($millions)
Difference
(A-B)
Modified 
Amount
($millions)
Original 
Amount      
($millions)
Difference
(D - E)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J)
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $965,033 $945,424 $19,609 $962,652 $944,152 $18,500 $882,128 2.1% 2.0% 6.0%
T-->2 * T $948,345 $945,424 $2,921 $946,322 $944,152 $2,170 $882,128 0.2% 0.2% 34.6%
M-->2 * M M $960,995 $945,424 $15,571 $959,499 $944,152 $15,347 $882,128 1.7% 1.6% 1.5%
T-->2 * T              
M-->2 * M M $964,029 $945,424 $18,605 $961,792 $944,152 $17,640 $882,128 2.0% 1.9% 5.5%
TNEI_T = 0             
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $946,515 $945,424 $1,091 $945,208 $944,152 $1,056 $882,128 0.1% 0.1% 3.3%
TNEI_T = 0 $945,286 $945,424 -$138 $944,024 $944,152 -$128 $882,128 0.0% 0.0% 7.8%
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $946,654 $945,424 $1,230 $945,336 $944,152 $1,184 $882,128 0.1% 0.1% 3.9%
T-->2 * T              
M-->2 * M              
TNEI_T = 0             
MNEI_M = 0 M, MNEI_M $965,120 $945,424 $19,696 $962,848 $944,152 $18,696 $882,128 2.1% 2.0% 5.3%
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $958,328 $942,871 $15,457 $955,887 $941,451 $14,436 $882,128 1.6% 1.5% 7.1%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM TOTTM $960,273 $942,871 $17,402 $957,872 $941,451 $16,421 $882,128 1.9% 1.7% 6.0%
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25  
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 $940,981 $942,871 -$1,890 $939,521 $941,451 -$1,930 $882,128 -0.2% -0.2% -2.1%
T_TOT--> T_TOT + 0.25  
M_TOT--> M_TOT - 0.25 $944,774 $942,871 $1,903 $943,387 $941,451 $1,936 $882,128 0.2% 0.2% -1.7%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM     
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25  
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 TOTTM $958,413 $942,871 $15,542 $955,972 $941,451 $14,521 $882,128 1.6% 1.5% 7.0%
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $959,064 $940,358 $18,706 $956,602 $939,031 $17,571 $882,128 2.0% 1.9% 6.5%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM TOTTM $957,038 $940,358 $16,680 $954,729 $939,031 $15,698 $882,128 1.8% 1.7% 6.3%
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25  
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 $939,182 $940,358 -$1,176 $937,772 $939,031 -$1,259 $882,128 -0.1% -0.1% -6.6%
T_TOT--> T_TOT + 0.25  
M_TOT--> M_TOT - 0.25 $941,595 $940,358 $1,237 $940,342 $939,031 $1,311 $882,128 0.1% 0.1% -5.6%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM     
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25  
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 TOTTM $955,899 $940,358 $15,541 $953,507 $939,031 $14,476 $882,128 1.6% 1.5% 7.4%
TNEI_T = 0 $940,252 $940,358 -$106 $938,937 $939,031 -$94 $882,128 0.0% 0.0% 12.8%
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $941,585 $940,358 $1,227 $940,213 $939,031 $1,182 $882,128 0.1% 0.1% 3.8%
TNEI_T = 0             
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $941,479 $940,358 $1,121 $940,119 $939,031 $1,088 $882,128 0.1% 0.1% 3.0%
MNEI_M = 0             
T_TOT--> T_TOT + 0.25  
M_TOT--> M_TOT - 0.25  MNEI_M $942,822 $940,358 $2,464 $941,524 $939,031 $2,493 $882,128 0.3% 0.3% -1.2%
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $959,456 $943,935 $15,521 $956,931 $942,443 $14,488 $882,128 1.6% 1.5% 7.1%
TOT--> 2 * TOT TOT $961,464 $943,935 $17,529 $959,125 $942,443 $16,682 $882,128 1.9% 1.8% 5.1%
TPRI_T-> TPRI_T+.25;   
TPRO_T-> TPRO_T+.25;   
MPRI_M-> MPRI_M+.25;   
MPRO_M-> MPRO_M+.25 MPRI_M $944,007 $943,935 $72 $942,535 $942,443 $92 $882,128 0.0% 0.0% -21.7%
TPRI_T-> TPRI_T+.25;   
TPRO_T-> TPRO_T+.25 $943,630 $943,935 -$305 $942,189 $942,443 -$254 $882,128 0.0% 0.0% 20.1%
MPRI_M-> MPRI_M+.25;   
MPRO_M-> MPRO_M+.25 MPRI_M $944,313 $943,935 $378 $942,789 $942,443 $346 $882,128 0.0% 0.0% 9.2%
TOT--> 2 * TOT         
TPRI_T-> TPRI_T+.25;   
TPRO_T-> TPRO_T+.25;   
MPRI_M-> MPRI_M+.25;   
MPRO_M-> MPRO_M+.25 TOT, MPRI_M $961,563 $943,935 $17,628 $959,242 $942,443 $16,799 $882,128 1.9% 1.8% 4.9%
LOG FILE
MODEL 12
MODEL 9
MODEL 10
MODEL 11
% of Estimated 
Reported 
Difference and 
Estimated 
Reported Tax 
Revenue
(F / E)
% Change in 
Estimated 
Assessed and 
Reported Tax 
Revenue
(C - F) / F
SIGNIFICANT 
VARIBLES
VARIABLE 
SUBSTITUTION
ESTIMATED ASSESSED TAX COLLECTIONS ESTIMATED REPORTED TAX COLLECTIONS
Actual Reported 
Collections      
($millions)
% of Estimated 
Reported 
Difference and 
Actual Reported 
Tax Revenue
(F / G)
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 TABLE 3 (cont.) 
LOG FILE VARIABLE SUBSTITUTION SIGNIFICANT VARIBLES
ESTIMATED REPORTED TAX 
REVENUE INCREASE 
RESULTING FROM CHANGE 
(Indirect Revenue Effect)
ESTIMATED ASSESSED TAX 
REVENUE INCREASE 
RESULTING FROM CHANGE  
DIFFERENCE             
(Direct Revenue Effect)
INDIRECT 
REVENUE 
EFFECT / TOTAL 
REVENUE 
EFFECT
(A) (B) (C) (D) D - C C / D
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $18,500,000,000 $19,609,000,000 $1,109,000,000 94.3%
T-->2 * T $2,170,000,000 $2,921,000,000 $751,000,000 74.3%
M-->2 * M M $15,347,000,000 $15,571,000,000 $224,000,000 98.6%
T-->2 * T             
M-->2 * M M $17,640,000,000 $18,605,000,000 $965,000,000 94.8%
TNEI_T = 0            
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $1,056,000,000 $1,091,000,000 $35,000,000 96.8%
TNEI_T = 0 -$128,000,000 -$138,000,000 -$10,000,000 92.8%
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $1,184,000,000 $1,230,000,000 $46,000,000 96.3%
T-->2 * T             
M-->2 * M             
TNEI_T = 0            
MNEI_M = 0 M, MNEI_M $18,696,000,000 $19,696,000,000 $1,000,000,000 94.9%
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $14,436,000,000 $15,457,000,000 $1,021,000,000 93.4%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM TOTTM $16,421,000,000 $17,402,000,000 $981,000,000 94.4%
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25 
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 -$1,930,000,000 -$1,890,000,000 $40,000,000 102.1%
T_TOT--> T_TOT + 0.25 
M_TOT--> M_TOT - 0.25 $1,936,000,000 $1,903,000,000 -$33,000,000 101.7%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM    
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25 
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 TOTTM $14,521,000,000 $15,542,000,000 $1,021,000,000 93.4%
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $17,571,000,000 $18,706,000,000 $1,135,000,000 93.9%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM TOTTM $15,698,000,000 $16,680,000,000 $982,000,000 94.1%
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25 
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 -$1,259,000,000 -$1,176,000,000 $83,000,000 107.1%
T_TOT--> T_TOT + 0.25 
M_TOT--> M_TOT - 0.25 $1,311,000,000 $1,237,000,000 -$74,000,000 106.0%
TOTTM--> 2 * TOTTM    
M_TOT--> M_TOT + 0.25 
T_TOT--> T_TOT - 0.25 TOTTM $14,476,000,000 $15,541,000,000 $1,065,000,000 93.1%
TNEI_T = 0 -$94,000,000 -$106,000,000 -$12,000,000 88.7%
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $1,182,000,000 $1,227,000,000 $45,000,000 96.3%
TNEI_T = 0            
MNEI_M = 0 MNEI_M $1,088,000,000 $1,121,000,000 $33,000,000 97.1%
MNEI_M = 0            
T_TOT--> T_TOT + 0.25 
M_TOT--> M_TOT - 0.25 MNEI_M $2,493,000,000 $2,464,000,000 -$29,000,000 101.2%
IAR2 --> 2 * IAR2 IAR2 $14,488,000,000 $15,521,000,000 $1,033,000,000 93.3%
TOT--> 2 * TOT TOT $16,682,000,000 $17,529,000,000 $847,000,000 95.2%
TPRI_T-> TPRI_T+.25;  
TPRO_T-> TPRO_T+.25;  
MPRI_M-> MPRI_M+.25;  
MPRO_M-> MPRO_M+.25 MPRI_M $92,000,000 $72,000,000 -$20,000,000 127.8%
TPRI_T-> TPRI_T+.25;  
TPRO_T-> TPRO_T+.25 -$254,000,000 -$305,000,000 -$51,000,000 83.3%
MPRI_M-> MPRI_M+.25;  
MPRO_M-> MPRO_M+.25 MPRI_M $346,000,000 $378,000,000 $32,000,000 91.5%
TOT--> 2 * TOT        
TPRI_T-> TPRI_T+.25;  
TPRO_T-> TPRO_T+.25;  
MPRI_M-> MPRI_M+.25;  
MPRO_M-> MPRO_M+.25 TOT, MPRI_M $16,799,000,000 $17,628,000,000 $829,000,000 95.3%
MODEL 12
MODEL 9
MODEL 10
MODEL 11
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